

really in favor of arms control and not simply trying to slow the process. He thought I was wrong in opposing SALT II. On a Friday afternoon, two weeks after I had been nominated, Senator Percy withdrew the objections he had against me. He said he would notify the White House that the committee was now unanimous that I should become the director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

I was quite surprised therefore, when I picked up the *Washington Post* on Monday morning, to read that the directorship of ACDA had been offered to Eugene Rostow. It was especially surprising because I had met Gene for lunch on the preceding Friday, seeking his advice on how to proceed with my plans for taking over ACDA.

Q: And he didn't tell you he had been offered the job?

A: No. On Monday, after I had read about the switch, I called him. Rostow said he had been approached on the job but told to keep it to himself.

He said he felt he was not at liberty to tell me that the ACDA job had been offered to him. I called the chief of staff at the White House and asked him what was going on. He said it was true that the White House had withdrawn my name and submitted Rostow's.

I said I would like to talk to President Reagan about the matter. He said, "Come over and let's talk."

The next day I went to the White House and talked to the chief of staff and several members of the California Mafia: Raker, Darman, and Deaver. Their explanation was that General Haig was named the Secretary of State and that it would not be well to have too many military men in the administration. Furthermore, they said, the administration had the Republicans on board and they needed support from the Democrats. Rostow was a prominent Democrat and could serve this purpose. I made no bones about being unhappy with their explanation and the stealth-like way in which the switch had been carried out. I said I wanted to talk to President Reagan about it.

Chief Negotiator, Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START)

They hemmed and hawed. It was obvious to me that President Reagan had not been consulted on the switch. The following day they said they felt that I was highly qualified to head the negotiating team, saying I could do more good in that job than being the director of ACDA [Arms Control and Disarmament Agency].

They added that I knew the Soviet negotiators, knew the issues, and could speak Russian. Therefore, they were prepared to offer me the job of chief negotiator of the strategic arms reduction talks [START]. While I didn't like the way in which my nomination had been withdrawn, the thought of becoming the chief negotiator of START sounded appealing. I accepted their offer.

Q: To go back a bit, what did you do while you were out of government and at the Wilson Center?

A: As I mentioned earlier, I spent most of my time writing a book on my negotiating experience. I also gave lectures around the country and attended various seminars and working groups sponsored by the Wilson Center.

One fascinating experience was to participate in a debate with George Kennan. This was, on the one hand, an interesting experience and, on the other hand, a painful one. I had been a great admirer of George Kennan back in the late 1940s when he was sending back from Helsinki his brilliant analyses of the Soviet scene. I also followed closely the reception that his famous article on containment, signed "Mr. X" received in the *Foreign Affairs* magazine. Later, in the mid-1950s, Kennan did an about-face. I thought that from this time on Kennan had become an apologist for the Soviet leaders. I also learned about the little-known "death pill" incident. Kennan thought he might have to commit suicide if drugged to reveal secrets. A West Point classmate, Peer de Silva, wrote about this in his book on the CIA. At any rate I entered the debate with George Kennan in New York City with mixed emotions.

While at the Wilson Center I also got to know Bronislav Geremek. Geremek, a Polish historian, was writing a book about the migration of Gypsies in 15th Century Europe. I tried to get Geremek interested in Solidarity, which was just getting underway. Geremek at first said he was not interested in anything that has happened in the last century. But he later became highly involved in Solidarity and subsequently one of Lech Walesa's chief advisors. He is now head of the Polish Senate.

Q: Tell me something about your job as chief U.S. negotiator of the strategic arms reduction talks. For whom did you work and what did you do?

A: As chief U.S. negotiator of START, I worked directly for the President. However, I took my instructions from General Haig, the Secretary of State. I had known Haig since 1950 when he was a lieutenant and I was a lieutenant colonel and we both worked for General Almond, the chief of staff for General MacArthur.



Professor Eugene V. Rostow, Ambassador Edward L. Rowny, and Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 1982.

Therefore I had a good rapport-an easy relationship-with Haig. When he became the Secretary of State and I the chief negotiator of START, we developed the plans for deep reductions of strategic arms to meet President Reagan's desires. We also worked at trying to reduce the right things. Let me explain.

SALT II had limited launchers of ballistic missiles but not the warheads on them. This was like limiting rifle tubes but not the bullets fired from the rifles. If you don't limit the number of bullets, then you can shoot an unlimited number of them from the rifle tubes. In SALT II we were determined to limit warheads as well as missiles and launchers.

The process of developing our plan for START was going rather slowly, and for this we were subjected to a great deal of criticism. One reason for going slow was that we first wanted to determine the direction in which our strategic modernization

program would proceed. We had to turn things around and get the right forces back into the programs. It didn't make much sense to reduce forces if we didn't know which ones we needed and needed building up.

A second reason why things went slowly in START was because most of the emphasis was placed on intermediate-range nuclear missiles. In December 1979 at the Rome session of NATO, the United States was called upon to embark on a two-track approach. On one track we were called upon to deploy Pershing II [PII] ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles [GLCMs] in Europe. The second track was to begin negotiations for the reduction of our PII's and GLCMs and the Soviets' SS-20s. The Soviets had large numbers of SS-20 ballistic missiles covering targets throughout Europe.

Ambassador Paul Nitze was named U.S. negotiator for the intermediate-range forces. Since there was a lot of pressure to get these INF [intermediate nuclear forces] talks started, it pushed the START talks into the background.

Q: Tell me something about Alexander Haig and his abilities.

A: I thought Secretary Haig was highly capable. He knew international issues and how to deal with them. He was a positive person; he felt, as he put it, that **the** United States should move out smartly. It was unfortunate that he got off on **the** wrong foot in the Reagan administration. Let me explain.

In the military, when an officer is assigned a new job he usually comes in with a prospectus of what he thinks should be done. He draws up a plan and submits it to the boss to show him the direction in which things should go. If the boss approves, the officer knows what to do. If he doesn't approve, he then gets guidance as to how to proceed.

Shortly after the inauguration Secretary Haig presented President Reagan with his plan of action. This was immediately interpreted by the White House hierarchy as an end run and a threat to their authority. I remain firmly convinced it was not an end run but the normal way in which we, as military officers, had been trained to approach a new job.

Secretary Haig got off to a bad start and things continued to deteriorate. The California Mafia surrounding Reagan felt threatened by Haig and proceeded to harass him. I recall being in Haig's office when Haig was called by persons in the White House who insisted upon micromanaging minor issues. Instead of rolling with the punches, Haig insisted on taking these persons on.

I was in the White House on the day the President was shot and was able to observe at first hand what happened. The initial word from the hospital was that the President was not hurt badly. Nevertheless, the entire cabinet was assembled. Reassuring messages kept coming from the hospital, but it made one wonder if it was true that the President's wound was really a minor one. Only Mrs. Reagan and the President's close California friends like Deaver and Raker were allowed to go to the hospital. This made us more suspicious that something was awry. Jim Brady, the President's spokesman, had been seriously wounded.

Brady's assistant briefed the press but didn't sound very assuring. The impression he was creating was that there was no one in control of the U.S. government. I was not present at the cabinet meeting but I learned that there was a sharp exchange between Weinberger and Haig about the order of succession. At any rate, Haig felt that the world was not getting a reassuring picture that someone was in charge. He came to the press room and made his famous "I'm in charge" speech, obviously upset and not very assuring himself. He probably suspected that the President was seriously hurt and also upset because he was being kept away from the hospital. The "I'm in charge" speech did Haig an inestimable amount of harm; the 30-second bite was played again and again on TV. His talk was played up by the California Mafia as another attempt by Haig to overstep his authority. It was the beginning of the end; only a matter of time before the White House decided to let Haig go.

I was in with Secretary Haig the night before he was fired. If he knew he was going to be dismissed, he didn't give any indication of it. The next day I attended the cabinet luncheon where several arms control issues were discussed. Haig presented the recommendation I had made to him well, and I was pleased that no one seriously opposed him.

After the luncheon Haig and several others were called into the Oval Office by the President. I went home to finish packing, since I was leaving for Geneva that evening. I received a phone call from my office saying that I should turn on my TV. I was surprised. Haig had just resigned. I knew things had not been going well, but I didn't think things had gone that far. It was Haig's swan song.

Q: I gather you consider Haig was competent and made a good Secretary of State.

A: Yes, I consider him a competent official and think he was an excellent Secretary of State. He's a positive, take-charge person, the kind we needed as secretary at that time. I believe he felt that he had the confidence of President Reagan and wanted to be his "vicar"-as he put it-in foreign affairs. But as I have said earlier, I saw something others didn't see. I saw a President in the hands of a

close coterie of trusted lieutenants who not only determined Reagan's policies but decided who would be on his team. They felt threatened by Haig and decided to move him out.

Q: In Reagan's first couple of years there were changes in Soviet leadership. Did this have any influence on how your meetings were going?

A: Yes. Brezhnev died and was replaced by Yuri Andropov who didn't have very long to live and was replaced by Konstantin Chernenko. We would no sooner get started on negotiations than a new Soviet leader appeared on the scene. Still, there was a great deal of continuity because all the negotiations were in the Brezhnev mold and Gromyko remained Soviet Foreign Minister. The policies didn't change.

The Soviet negotiators continued to be obstinate, entirely one-sided. They were not very forthcoming on any of the major issues. It was a difficult time to try to make progress on arms control.

Q: Let's continue to talk about personalities. You've been dealing with the Russians for almost 20 years now, haven't you?

A: Not quite; only since 1973.

Q: That's 17 years. During that time did you become close friends with any of the Soviets?

A: Close friends would be too strong a way to put it. You certainly get to know your counterparts quite well and you do develop a rapport with them. You learn how far you can go and can, after a while, predict what they're going to do. But Soviet officials do not make friends with foreigners. They're dedicated to their work and are loyal to their superiors. One of the great disappointments of working with the Soviets is that at best you can develop a working relationship with them. But even then, this often changes overnight and the Soviets revert to type. On the whole I have a high respect for Soviet negotiators; they are professionals in their business. But in terms of making any close or lasting friends, it just doesn't happen.

Q: Can you tell me something about where and how you conducted your negotiations?

A: As I mentioned earlier, I spent most of my time writing a book on my negotiating experience. I also gave lectures around the country and attended various seminars and working groups sponsored by the Wilson Center.

Q: To go back a bit, what did you do while you were out of government and at the Wilson Center?

A: Yes. Let me first address where we negotiated. In SALT I, the negotiations rotated among three capitals: Geneva, Vienna, and Helsinki. However, it became such a logistic headache that the two sides settled on one meeting place: Geneva. And in SALT II and START we continued to meet in Geneva.

As for the negotiating teams, we were roughly parallel. During SALT II the Soviets had a chief and six negotiators on their side and we had a chief and five on our side. As military representative to SALT II, I had two three-star Soviet generals opposite me. I thought this was unfair. While one Soviet general was



Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher and the U.S. representative to START, Ambassador Edward L. Rowny, Geneva, 3 February 1983.

talking the other was thinking of what to say next. Moreover, the Soviets insisted on equal time to speak and to them this meant equal time for each person. As a result, the Soviets had twice as much time as I had to present a case. Later, before we commenced START, I asked the Secretary of State to arrange through diplomatic channels for us to have an equal number of negotiators on both sides. The Soviets agreed.

However, when we arrived in Geneva for our first meeting there was one and five on our side but one and six on their side as there always had been. Instead of beginning to negotiate I called a recess and spoke to my opposite number, Viktor Karpov. I told him the U.S. and USSR had agreed through diplomatic channels that there would be an equal number of negotiators on both sides. He disclaimed any knowledge about the agreement and said that his instructions were that there be one and six on the Soviet side.

I continued the recess and sent a note to our headquarters asking that the senior U.S. advisor be sent to the meeting. When he arrived I appointed him, on the spot, to be a negotiator. We then resumed the meeting with one and six on each side.

Karpov smiled ruefully, and said, "The U.S. never worried about such things before and you can't blame me for trying. To us," he said, "form is as important as substance. As a matter of fact," he said, "to us form is substance." As time passed I found this to be true; the Soviets always placed a great deal of emphasis on form.

We generally met twice a week, every Tuesday and Thursday. On Tuesdays the Soviets came to our location on the top floor of the Botanic Building and on Thursdays we met behind the fenced-in compound which was reinforced by barbed wire. Whoever was the host would allow the guest to make the first statement. These statements, which we called plenary statements, were carefully worded positions on some issue, they usually lasted about 30 to 40 minutes. After that, we would break up into one-on-one pairings for informal discussions. These informal sessions would last two or three, sometimes four hours. Whenever the plenary statements were binding on our respective governments, the informal sessions were not.

After we broke up we would come home and hold a debriefing session among ourselves. I would then dictate a short summary of highlights which we cabled to Washington. Karpov told me the Soviets did the same thing, and like us, followed the cable with a longer memorandum for record which we airgrammed back home. As Dean Acheson once said, "no person puts himself in a bad light in his own

memorandum for record,” and we were no exceptions. Karpov confided to me that he too reported that he had done brilliantly and “slaughtered” us.

This twice-a-week schedule might sound like a relaxed pace, but considering the preparation time and follow-up reporting, it was a demanding schedule.

Q: Can you tell me something about the substance of your START negotiations?

A: The first thing that President Reagan decided to do was to determine what U.S. forces needed before we began negotiating with the Soviets. Fifteen years of neglect of our military forces had left us in a weakened posture which put our security in jeopardy. It also undermined any leverage we might have at the negotiating table. While President Reagan was determined to improve our military posture, he realized that our resources were not unlimited. The first step in developing the five-year modernization plan was to figure out where to put our priority efforts and how to allocate scarce resources to areas that needed them most.

I was fortunate in being a player in this exercise. It gave me a better understanding of what our weaknesses were and how we were going to correct them. It also gave me the opportunity of evaluating which parts of the modernization program would later give us strength at the negotiating table. This process took place for the most part in the Pentagon, although there were some cabinet meetings on it to which I was privileged to attend.

We learned early in the game that our command, control, communications and intelligence systems, what is known in the military jargon as **C³I**, were in pretty bad shape. Even the forces we had could not have readily been put into action because we didn't have the command structure and communications hardware to control our forces. A high priority was assigned to the littleknown and unglamorous-but highly important task-of improving **C³I**.

Once **C³I** improvement was started it was decided to modernize strategic forces across-the-board. We wanted simultaneously to bring the land-based leg of the triad up to higher degree of effectiveness, to push forward the sea-based leg of the triad, and improve our airborne forces. One of the first actions that President Reagan took was to put the BI program back on track which President Carter had derailed earlier. As the five-year plan evolved, it got into important systems beyond the three legs of the triad, such as developing sea- and air-launched cruise missiles. This was important because U.S. cruise missile technology had moved ahead of the Soviets' technology by an estimated five to eight years.



U.S. START delegation and President Reagan. Maurice Eisenstein, General Donald Aldridge, Ambassador Sol Polansky, Ambassador Edward L. Rowny, President Ronald Reagan, Michael Mobbs, William Spahr, and Donald Tice.

There was a great deal of criticism that President Reagan was slow in getting back to the negotiating table. But President Reagan was unperturbed. He was determined not to rush into negotiations before he knew where we were going with our force structures and what our baseline would be.

Another reason why we didn't move rapidly into negotiations was because priority was given to INF negotiations. You will recall that earlier I said that NATO ministers, meeting in Rome, called for a two-track approach to meet the Soviet SS-20 threat. This two-track approach to INF meant that our departmental bureaucracies were devoting a great deal of attention to INF. This delayed preparations for getting the strategic arms negotiations going.

At the beginning of the Reagan administration, President Reagan made several speeches which were to form the shape of future policies. One speech he gave early on said it was not enough simply to contain communism but that we needed to supersede communism.

Reagan's next important speech, given at his alma mater, Eureka College, was an outline of what he planned to do in strategic arms negotiations. He said it was not sufficient to limit arms but necessary to reduce them.

To give emphasis to reductions over limitations, he changed the acronym from SALT to START [strategic arms reductions talks]. Significantly, Reagan pointed out that it is not sufficient to limit launchers of weapons as SALT had done, but that we needed to limit the warheads on missiles to be fired from the launchers. He made limiting warheads the main object of reductions. He also proposed that there be a reduction of throw-weight, that is, the total amount of nuclear power. This was highly important because the Soviets had roughly four times as much nuclear power as the United States. If total nuclear power were not brought back into line, not much would be accomplished in the field of arms control.

Two other important items to which attention was paid were equitability and verifiability. The Soviets were willing to take percentage cuts, but not to lower equal levels. President Reagan stressed that equality be the watchword.

Reagan also stated that the U.S. would enter into no agreement that was not verifiable. This was very difficult to achieve because the Soviets had always resisted intrusive verification measures. The Soviets habitually ruled out any type of on-site inspection. We also encountered difficulties with verification in SALT II over such items as encryption of telemetry.

In summary, President Reagan wanted to negotiate with the Soviets on reducing substantially the numbers of strategic offensive arms. He also wanted to reduce the right things and do it in a verifiable way.

Q: When you spoke about establishing priorities for modernizing arms after our 15 years of neglect, are you taking the neglect as far back as the Nixon administration?

A: Our neglect of strategic arms predates the Nixon administration. It began with McNamara's unilateral cuts in the early 1960s. McNamara thought that if we limited our forces, the Soviets would follow our example and limit theirs. You will recall that he said we would not deploy more than 1,000 ICBMs because there was no need to go beyond that number. He said the Soviets had neither the capability nor the intention of ever surpassing us.



Briefing former President Richard M. Nixon.

He was wrong on both counts. By the time SALT I was signed in 1972, the Soviets had not only caught up to us but were ahead by 50 percent in ICBMs and 50 percent in nuclear armed submarines as well. Whereas we stopped building at 1,000, they went up to 1,600 ICBMs. Whereas we stayed at 40 submarines, they went up to 62. As Harold Brown, President Carter's Secretary of Defense said, "When we built, they built. When we cut, they built even more."

- Q: Did President Reagan's five-year plan envision our catching up or surpassing the Soviets?
- A: Our five-year plan envisaged moving up towards the Soviet levels, but we had no plans to surpass them. We felt that if we moved towards them, it would give us leverage and they would start moving down. We believed that if we modernized our forces it would do two things. First, it would take care of our own security.

Second, it would give us leverage at the negotiating table and help drive the Soviets down.

Q: What about our NATO allies?_ Did we have their full support or were they opposed to our modernization?

A: In general, we had the support of our allies. But this was not easily achieved because many of them were worried that our force modernization plan would act against arms control. They hoped that somehow the Soviets would reduce their weapons without our having to increase ours. But we saw no way of accomplishing this. We consulted extensively with our allies to convince them that we were serious about arms control. At the same time we had great difficulties with our allies in getting them to accept U.S. cruise missiles and Pershing intermediate-range ballistic missiles on European soil. This was so even though the NATO ministers had asked for such deployments. Once we decided to comply with their request, it sparked a lot of debate in NATO capitals over whether they should really accept our weapons on their soil.

Q: You mentioned that our command and ~~control—C³I—was~~ in bad shape. Would you elaborate?

A: Yes. Our means for communicating with our strategic forces left much to be desired. We did not have a national command authority which was secure and also redundant and had tenuous means of communicating with the forces. This was particularly true with our naval forces. We had to push new concepts of propagating low-frequency waves from certain locations in the U. S. to the submarines at sea. The entire structure of our command, control and communications required overhaul; it had been neglected too long. Our intelligence capability also left a great deal to be desired, particularly in the number of satellites we were putting up and the amount of information we were collecting from them. While these matters were not publicly debated and were not very glamorous, they were recognized by the professionals as being at the heart of the problem.

If you can't communicate with your strategic forces, you can't control them. And if the enemy knows you can't—and our intelligence sources told us they knew of our difficulties—the threat of retaliation is a hollow threat.



Soviet Mission, Geneva, Switzerland. Ambassador Edward L Rowny, second from right, June 1984.

You have spoken about the importance of U.S. negotiators being able to speak Russian. Where did you learn to speak Russian?

A: I went to the Yale graduate school in 1947. I really wanted to study international relations, but the Army said they didn't have any programs in this field. They said I could, however, study engineering. As a result, I moonlighted. I earned two master's degrees simultaneously-one in engineering and the other in international relations. To get a master's degree you needed to be proficient in two foreign languages. I had studied French and decided to pursue it as one of my languages. And since I decided to deal with nuclear weapons and that meant dealing with the only other superpower, I decided to study Russian. I'm not at the translator level but understand and speak Russian fairly well.

Q: Have you been able to improve your Russian language capability over the years?

A: Yes. Once I was assigned the job of negotiating with the Soviets, I took an intense course of instruction at Berlitz, known as their total immersion course. That helped considerably. Then I continued to devote an hour a day to studying Russian. Moreover, I tried to exercise it whenever I could when I met Russians. As a result my fluency improved over time.

Q: What happened in Geneva between the time you began negotiating and when the Soviets broke off negotiations in 1984?

A: Our original plan to proceed in two steps was not well received by the Soviets. We said it was important to first reduce the ballistic threat and only after this was agreed would we talk about reducing bombers and cruise missiles. To us, this seemed a logical way to proceed. But from the outset the Soviets resisted our plan. They felt we were trying to limit them since they had the advantage in the ballistic missiles field and not limit ourselves in bomber and cruise missile fields where we had the advantage. All our talk about how this was an orderly way to proceed fell on deaf ears.

I want to digress to talk about an interesting milestone that occurred during these negotiations. That was the famous speech in March 1983 in which the President laid out his guidelines for what is now known as the strategic defense initiative.

You recall that from my earliest talks with the President he felt we should build up our strategic defenses so there would be a balance between defensive and offensive forces.

There was not much prior information about what the President was about to do and it came as a surprise when he made his SDI speech. Secretary Haig told me later he felt that the matter had not been discussed sufficiently with the principals involved. I sided with the President's decision that he should outline his vision and call for strategic defense without a lot of



Edward Rowny with President Ronald Reagan, 19 December 1984.



Cartoon from San Francisco Chronicle of START negotiators Edward Rowny and Viktor Karpov. The Kerry Waghorn drawing is reprinted by permission of Chronicle Features, San Francisco, California.

prior discussion. Had he done so, I think the Congress would have killed the program before it was born.

We were in Geneva when the President made his speech on the strategic defense initiative. As a matter of fact, I headed the five-year review of the ABM treaty, which was then in progress. The treaty review was divided into two parts. The first part was a philosophical discussion which I carried on with Karpov at my level. The second part dealt with details and was carried out by the Standing Consultative Commission [SCC].

I was in the act of discussing the philosophical underpinnings of offense and defense when the President made his speech. The speech created a firestorm in Geneva. Ambassador Karpov, my opposite number, became agitated and accused the United States of having violated the ABM treaty by proposing the SDI [strategic defense initiative] program. I told him right off that we were not violating the ABM treaty. Karpov criticized me for making such a statement without having

first checked with Washington. I told him I knew enough about SDI that I didn't have to check with Washington.

The next day Karpov called on me and apologized for having accused the President of violating the ABM treaty. However, he said it violated the spirit of that treaty. I bring this up to highlight the extreme sensitivity with which the Soviets regard SDI.

But let me return to the negotiations. In the spring of 1984 I recommended to President Reagan that we collapse the two phases of our plan and talk about simultaneously reducing ballistic missiles, bombers, and cruise missiles. The President approved my recommendation.

With that big obstacle overcome, we began to make progress through the spring and summer towards a START agreement. We were quite optimistic. This was in sharp contrast to what was happening in INF, where the Soviets were making ominous noises about breaking off negotiations if the U.S. insisted on deploying its missiles in Europe.

We were also making a fair amount of progress on the verification provisions, the definitions, and other aspects of the START agreement. But one rather large obstacle remained. The Soviets insisted that every weapon deployed on a bomber count the same as a ballistic missile warhead. We said that this was unacceptable because we needed the bomber weapons to penetrate Soviet formidable air defenses. We simply could not equate a bomb on a bomber with a missile warhead on an ICBM.


There were other obstacles, such as how to treat air-launched and submarine-launched cruise missiles. Ground-launched cruise missiles, not being strategic, were not in my court; they were handled in INF.

It was during this time that Paul Nitze and Youli Kvitsinky had their famous walk in the woods. Nitze tried out a personal idea to try to break the logjam. He did not believe the Kohl government could carry the day and deploy U.S. PIIs and GLCMs on German soil. Knowing that the Soviets were more concerned with PIIs which could strike targets in Germany and Poland against which there were no air defenses, Nitze proposed to Kvitsinky that the Soviets should reduce their SS-20s to a number equal to GLCMs, and that we would give up deploying PIIs. Nitze's team heard rumors of his proposal, but Nitze would not discuss it with them. Knowing that I was opposed to Nitze's plan, they asked that I intervene. I tried, but Nitze wouldn't talk to me about it.

Fortunately, even before the U.S. turned down Nitze's plan, the Soviets turned it down in Moscow. I was greatly relieved. If Nitze had been successful in giving up our Pershing IIs, we would never have achieved a satisfactory INF agreement.

Nitze was wrong. The Germans courageously deployed PIIs and GLCMs on their soil. As they had threatened if deployments went ahead, the Soviets walked out of the INF treaty negotiations. We continued our START negotiations for several additional meetings. But then Karpov told me that until the INF problem was resolved the Soviets would not come back to the START negotiations. In December of 1983, when we went home for the Christmas break, we had no return date in mind.

The talks remained suspended for a year. Meanwhile, Brezhnev had died and so had Andropov and Chernenko who succeeded him. Gorbachev had now emerged as the new Soviet leader.



President Ronald Reagan, Paul Nitze, Edward L. Rowncy, and Vice President George Bush.

In January of 1985 Secretary Schultz met with Foreign Minister Gromyko in Geneva. The Soviets said they would come back to the table but only if we discussed the ABM treaty and space. We opposed this and wanted to negotiate only START and INF. We said we were willing to talk about strategic defenses but not about space. A compromise was worked out whereby there would be three sets of negotiations, START, INF, and a new forum to deal with D&S [defense and space].

The Soviets suggested, informally, that both sides start fresh with new negotiators. Knowing how much stock they put in continuity, I didn't take this seriously and recommended to the White House that they offer the job of negotiating D&S to Max Kampelman. I had known Kampelman from my days in the Wilson Center in 1979 when he was a member of the center's board of directors. Kampelman had negotiated the Helsinki accords and had done a good job. When President Reagan was elected, I recommended that Kampelman, although a Democrat, be kept on the job. Nitze's wife was ill and he let it be known that he did not plan to go back to

Geneva to negotiate INF. Nitze's deputy, Mike Glitman, seemed a natural for the job. I also heard rumors that Senator Tower was looking for a job in Geneva but thought he might become the D&S negotiator.

Imagine my surprise, therefore, when I was summoned to Secretary Schultz's office and told the President had decided to put in a new team of negotiators. I told him I was shocked that we had fallen for the Soviet ploy of putting in new negotiators. I was certain they would not do so.

Schultz said it was beside the point. The President would name Kampelman the overall negotiator who would also negotiate D&S. Senator Tower would take my place as START negotiator and Glitman would take Nitze's place in INF.

“Well,” I said, “I think the President is making a mistake but he's the boss. ”

Special Advisor to the President, Arms Control Matters

Schultz said the President wanted **Nitze** and me to stay on and become special advisors to him on arms control. "He wants to take more interest in arms control and thought he would like to have you stay in Washington, close at hand, to advise him." I told Schultz I was a big boy and he didn't have to sugar-coat the pill. If they didn't want me, I was ready to leave. "no, no," Schultz insisted, "the President wants you." I said I would like to hear it from the President himself. Schultz called up the President and got me an immediate appointment to see him.

On the way to the White House, Schultz said he hoped I wouldn't turn the President down when he made his request for me to stay on. I said, "Well, I want to hear it from him."

Schultz did not go into the Oval Office with me when I met with the President. The President asked me what I thought about the new team. I said it was his call, but I always considered continuity to be important and was certain the Soviets wouldn't change their team. He said that his idea was not to change the team but to have me in Washington where I could concentrate on advising him. I said, "Mr. President, you don't have to let me down easy. It was an honor to have served you, and I think I should leave and do something else."

“No,” he insisted, “I want you to stay. ”

I said I didn't know how it would work. "I won't have a portfolio; I won't have a real job."